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This may seem a quixotic task, in light of the many criticisms of such views. 2 Nevertheless, it seems to me that there is much of potential value in Collingwood's theory of art as the expression of emotion, but that equally, much reconstruction is necessary in order to transform the theory into even a minimally defensible and coherent theory of art--as art is conventionally understood, that is. I shall both provide some unusual criticisms 3 of Collingwood's theory, and also engage in a novel reconstruction of some of its central claims.
In particular, it will be shown that Collingwood's main concept of expression of emotion is radically ambiguous as it stands, in that it will be necessary to distinguish no less than sixteen different senses or kinds of expression of emotion in this paper (summarized in 1 Section VIII), all of which have some relevance to his enterprise. Thus, even if there is no general agreement that the resulting, reconstructed theory is a viable or interesting one, the paper may be of some value in exhibiting some of the complexities that would be involved in any adequate analysis of an expression theory such as that of Collingwood.
However, it is only fair to point out from the start that my goals for a desirable theory of art are much more conventional than those of Collingwood himself. He writes that "Every utterance and every gesture that each one of us makes is a work of art" (PA p. 285), on which view all genuinely expressive acts are artistic. My goal is the much more modest one of trying to construct a viable expression theory of art, as art is ordinarily understood--and hence which distinguishes the kinds of creative expression involved in the production of artworks from the more general pool of expressive acts that Collingwood is concerned with. Thus my 'criticisms' of his theory might be regarded as being, strictly speaking, counterfactual criticisms: pointing out defects that his theory would have, were it to be regarded as having the same goals as a conventional theory of art. 4 In particular, I shall offer a criticism that his theory fails to give an adequate account of the distinctively creative nature of artistic activity, as opposed to other kinds of expressive activity. He might think this a parochial or even misleading distinction, 5 but I think it nevertheless worth making in any case, whatever one's goals for a theory of art.
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The reconstructed theory to be presented makes integral use of several different concepts of interpretation, and a general theme of the discussion will be that there is no hope of making sense of the differences and interrelations of Collingwood's various concepts of expression of emotion--let alone constructing a viable theory of art from them--other than in fundamentally interpretive terms.
The discussion will proceed as follows. First I assemble some brief reminders as to characteristic views of Collingwood on expression, and make an initial interpretive point about them. Then a significant dilemma concerning his main view of expression is uncovered, neither alternative of which is fully coherent. Next, in light of this very basic failure in his view, Sections III-V will investigate various aspects of expression in alternative interpretive terms, with Sections VI and VII providing an outline of a novel interpretive theory of art that could potentially serve as a reconstruction of an expression theory. by invoking an account involving different levels of experience: though the emotion must be fully expressed at the lowest level, and hence experienced at that level, nevertheless one can fail at that time to consciously experience it at higher levels, and hence be "...trying to convert [it] into the material of an experience at a higher level, which when he achieves it will be at once an emotion at this higher level and an expression appropriate to it."
I. COLLINGWOOD ON EXPRESSION OF EMOTION
My first comment on this account is that it cannot succeed without at least covertly invoking some appropriate concept of interpretation--or, alternatively put, that
Collingwood's concept of 'conversion' from a lower level to a higher one is itself an interpretive concept. For compare the situation with a perceptual one. The perceptual 5 analogy of Collingwood's view would be a view that we directly perceive sense-data, of which we are aware--no unsensed sense-data, just as no unexpressed emotions--and which we also " try[ing] to convert into the material of an experience at a higher level", so that we can also perceive physical objects. But that account of perception is an irreducibly interpretive one, on which the sense-data, which are not themselves physical objects, have to be somehow interpreted as physical objects as part of the 'conversion'
process.
On the other hand, a direct realist theory of perception, which denies that there are any lower-level conscious perceptual experiences of sense-data, would not be an interpretive theory, because it does not postulate distinct levels of perceptual consciousness, the linking of which would require some kind of interpretation or conversion.
Thus my initial concern with this 'conversion' part of Collingwood's account is that what he is offering us seems to be an account of a higher-level interpretation of lower-level emotions, rather than of a higher-level expression of those emotions. For the 'expression' part of his concept of 'conversion' expression is, to all appearances, no longer doing any work in his analysis (see the last quote above) since he mentions expression as such only in connection with same-level expression of emotions (in claiming that all emotions occur only in a same-level expressed form in experience). Thus the entire explanatory burden shifts to whatever is the appropriate concept of a higher-level interpretation of lower-level emotions.
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In the next Section I shall raise further problems about this 'conversion' aspect of Collingwood's views.
II. COLLINGWOOD'S CONVERSION DILEMMA
I shall now argue that the 'conversion' aspect of Collingwood's theory of expression-C-expression, or conversion of a lower-level to a higher-level expression of emotion--involves him in a crippling dilemma (which dilemma is further discussed in Section VII).
The dilemma concerns two possible but incompatible analyses of the concept of Cexpression of emotion X, evidence for both of which analyses may be found in his writings, but neither of which alternatives is fully coherent relative to the general goals of his theory. (Any references simply to 'expression' rather than C-expression in this Section will be to same-level expressions--S-expressions--of emotion).
In summary form, the dilemma is that either emotion X retains its precise qualitative identity through the process of its being C-expressed, or it does not. But if X remains ontologically unchanged by its C-expression, then Collingwood lacks any account of what makes an artist's activities creative; while on the other hand, if X is changed by its C-expression, into a distinct emotion X', it then becomes entirely mysterious how the relevant C-expression is of the initial emotion X itself, rather than merely being an expression of a new and distinct emotion X'. Here now is a more extended description of the dilemma.
The first horn of the dilemma may be introduced with the aid of the following logical and metaphysical argument. If there is some specific emotion X that an artist C-expresses, then it must be that emotion X, with its precise qualities, and no other, that ends up being fully expressed by the artist, on pain of her failing to fully C-express that specific emotion X. Hence ontologically there can be no difference--either numerically or qualitatively--between the emotion in C-unexpressed form--as a low-level emotion--and in fully C-expressed form as a higher-level emotion.
On this account, the only possible change that could occur during the process of Cexpression in question is a change in the artist's epistemic relation to that single precise emotion X. The initial quotes provided from Collingwood seem to conform to this horn of the dilemma: the ontological point is implicit in his discussions, while the epistemic point is explicit.
But if only the artist's epistemic relation to that emotion X changes, in what sense is this a genuine case of artistic creativity? For pre-theoretically, artistic creativity, if it is to be genuinely creative at all, must involve the bringing into existence of something that did not exist before. Yet on this epistemic account of C-expression of emotion X, strictly speaking C-expression involves only a personal discovery of, or new knowledge about, the nature of one's prior emotion--not a creation of anything.
Ontologically speaking, at best only the initial emotion X would qualify as a newly existent entity, created by the artist; but on the current interpretation of Collingwood, it is not that low-level emotion X itself that is supposed to be the newly created art, but instead it is the higher-level C-expression of that emotion that is supposed to be the newly created art. Hence, it may be concluded, this specific 'conversion' account of creative artistic activity is incoherent, in that it fundamentally confuses ontological with epistemic changes. Call this Collingwood's epistemic C-expression or EC-expression concept. Turning now to the other horn of the dilemma, suppose that emotion X is changed by its C-expression into a qualitatively or numerically distinct emotion X'. This would at least initially seem to address the previous creativity problem, in that on this account expression would actually change an emotion--or it would replace it with a distinct one--hence ensuring that there has been an ontological as well as an epistemic change, as a result of the artist's expression. 7 Call this Collingwood's ontological C-expression or OCexpression concept.
However, the problem now is that on this OC-expression account, the artist ends up having C-expressed this new and (at least qualitatively) distinct emotion X', instead of having C-expressed, as was her original intention, the initial emotion X. But on this interpretation of Collingwood, his account is incoherent for a different reason than before, namely because there has been an explanatory breakdown: one cannot explain what it is to C-express emotion X by saying merely that it is a matter of C-expressing a distinct emotion X' instead.
To be sure, the concept of C-expression itself assumes a rough structural account of how emotions X and X' are related, namely as lower and higher-level forms of an emotion.
But my point is that that relatedness cannot be explained simply in terms of any concept of expression, without further supplementation by appropriate interpretive concepts. And indeed, as noted at the end of the previous Section, the concept of expression itself, as employed in connection with C-expression, seems potentially to be completely replaceable by some appropriate concept of inter-level or C-interpretation.
Thus, to sum up this Section, two incompatible variants of Collingwood's C-expression concept have been investigated--epistemic C-expression versus ontological C-expression--and each has been found to fail in its explanatory function at a very basic level.
In light of this explanatory failure, Sections III-V will investigate various aspects of expression in interpretive terms.
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III. THE POSITING OF UNEXPRESSED EMOTIONS
The interpretive concern raised in Section I regarding Collingwood's account of expression arose at least partly because of his view that there are no unexpressed emotions--that all emotions are S-expressed, or expressed at the same level as that of the emotion itself. However, even if this S-expression requirement were dropped, some interpretive issues would still arise, in all but the most prosaic cases of expression of emotion--such as those of expression, in words or some other medium, of some highlevel emotion of which one is already fully conscious.
least naturally be interpreted by critics as being so--even though there were no real or virtual (see below) intentional emotions of the artist that the work expresses.
A more sophisticated kind of case should also be distinguished, in which an artist does set out to produce an artwork that expresses some specific emotion, but which emotion is not an emotion that she herself actually feels--or, even if she does feel it, her personal emotion is not allowed by her to guide her production of the finished artwork. Such cases could be described as cases of virtual or V-expression of emotion (though of course it is the emotion that is virtual, rather than the expression of it).
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Returning to the concept of free or F-expression, it seems likely that cases of completely free expression, in which at no stage in the development of a work does the artist attempt to express an emotion, whether deliberately or spontaneously, and whether of her own or of some virtual kind, would be exceedingly rare or vestigial. For if we provisionally adopt the point of view of traditional expression theories of art such as that of Collingwood, according to which any kind of creative artistic intention would qualify as an intention to express an emotion, then free expression would have to be completely spontaneous or improvisatory--not simply unplanned, but not even qualifying as genuinely intentional action on the artist's part. Thus for current purposes it is legitimate to ignore any such 'fringe' F-expression cases (if there are any) as mere accidental novelties, 10 and thus to regard all central cases of artistic creativity as involving the expression by an artist of some specific emotion, whether the emotion is real or virtual.
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V. NON-AMPLIATIVE VERSUS AMPLIATIVE EXPRESSION
In this Section two basic categories of expression will be discussed. As an initial and rough characterization of the two kinds, non-ampliative expression covers those cases in which the substantive content or information provided by a full expression does not go significantly beyond the content or information already present in the original emotion, whereas with an ampliative expression, the substantive content does go beyond that contained in the original emotion. I shall argue that the concept of 'ampliative expression' must be given an interpretive analysis.
An example of non-ampliative expression would be provided--if psychoanalytic theory may be believed--by the case of a couple who have built up much unconscious resentment and hostility toward each other over many years, and who, perhaps with the aid of psychoanalysis, become able to express their mutual hostility. This is, at least in its broad outlines, a non-ampliative case, because according to psychoanalytic theory, all of the content or information that is eventually expressed by each is already present in unconscious form in their unexpressed but highly developed emotions. (Putting aside any novel hostilities that might arise between them in the psychoanalytic sessions themselves). In Collingwood's terms, this would be a conversion kind of expression, in which lower-level information is expressed at a higher level. To be sure, some conversion cases might themselves be ampliative, in that the artist might ampliatively interpret an emotion in some way that goes beyond what would be involved in a strict expression of, or a making explicit of, the content of that emotion.
But it is a contingent matter as to whether a given case of conversion is ampliative or not, requiring further discussion or evidence--on which see more below.
This basic ontological kind of ampliative expression--OA-expression--should be distinguished from an epistemic variety, EA-expression, which concerns subjective rather than objective information. For example, the couple discussed above with unconscious hostilities toward each other might well achieve an epistemic ampliative expression (EAexpression) of their hostilities through psychoanalysis, in that they come to explicitly understand what previously they did not, even though no OA-expression was achieved, because the very same objective information concerning the emotions was cognitively present, in some form, in each person both prior to and subsequent to their psychoanalysis.
Applying these concepts to Collingwood, the dilemma discussed in Section II is relevant as follows. for the significant ontological changes required for normal cases of genuine creative artistic expression. 13 Here is some further discussion of ontological ampliative or OA-expression (which kind is being discussed if no epistemic qualifier is specified). My first point about the fact that most artworks are the products of ampliative expression, or are 'ampliative' for short, is that it serves to strongly reinforce the claim that artistic expression involves, at least in typical cases, a significant element of interpretation. For now, in addition to the initial kinds of 'translational' or conversion interpretation uncovered--that depend on non-trivial but relatively technical or philosophical issues of translatability between different levels or forms of an emotion--there is the additional fact that artworks are typically ampliative in substantive ways, so that a more substantive concept of ampliative interpretation (specifically, OA-interpretation) will also be a required theoretical tool in an adequate analysis of artistic expression--whether of conversion or non-conversion kinds. 14 This concept of ampliative interpretation by artists may be parallel in several respects to a more familiar concept of interpretation, namely that in which literary critics 'interpret' a given literary work when they provide a commentary on it. Though the matter is controversial, if it is possible to have various different but equally acceptable interpretations of a single literary work, this could be taken as suggesting that they too are ampliative interpretations, each of which extends a single work in a different direction. 15 While in the performing arts, there is general agreement that individual performances of a work will typically have aesthetic properties that go beyond those occurring in the work itself, so that, if this view is correct, performances may also be, or involve, ampliative interpretations. will be discussed in those reconstructive terms, though my primary aim is to arrive at an adequate theory of art rather than to provide an exercise in historical exegesis.
First, expression theorists clearly believed that a very wide concept of emotion is possible, wide enough to encompass any kind of creation of artworks. 18 The nearest I can come to this is to concentrate only on representational art, which has some representational content or subject matter, 19 and to argue that what artists do is to provide some sort of interpretation of their chosen subject matter. 20 An interpretation on my account is any kind of function of, or operation upon, a given content--anything, that is, except a mere reproduction of that content in its original form, which would not be creative or interpretive at all. Thus interpretations include attitudes, stances, approaches, evaluations, affective states including emotions and feelings, formal or substantive commentaries or comments (whether in words or other medium), and so on: anything that does something with a content or subject matter, rather than merely reproducing it untouched.
A recovery of the view that, in artistic contexts, all of these are in some sense expressions of emotion is possible as follows. Creative artists could not be so without feeling passionate about the importance of the interpretations of subject matters that constitute the core of their originality as artists. They must feel deeply about these interpretations that they are attempting to provide, or their work would be merely trivial or superficial.
Hence their works must be an expression of emotion, in that they are an expression of their passionate involvement with the specific kind of interpretation that they are attempting to provide for the relevant subject matter.
This account could be ontologically deepened in terms of the unique nature of each artist.
It is not a generic passionate commitment to a given kind of interpretation X of subject matter S that is expressed, but rather a unique passion that derives from the singular character and personality, or emotional core, of a particular artist that is expressed.
Thus on this account there are initially two kinds of artistic expression of emotion. The first applies universally: genuine artists must be emotionally committed to the interpretations they provide, and in a uniquely characteristic way, no matter what kinds of interpretations those are, and hence in that sense they must express their emotions about their subject matters. And secondly, some kinds of interpretation are themselves 20 inherently affective, such as an emotional and cognitive stance of outrage--whether actual or virtual--at some political atrocity, such as with Picasso's Guernica.
But thirdly, the more prosaic sense in which the subject matter of art may itself include the emotions of certain persons, such as characters in a play--whether or not the artist has her own affective attitudes toward those emotions--also needs to be considered--Content expression. Thus, in sum, all genuine art is expressive of the individual artist's unique emotional commitment to the importance of her chosen interpretation, and in addition, the interpretations provided by some artists in some works are themselves affective interpretations of their subject matters, while the subject matter of a work may itself include affective elements.
Next, we need to reconstruct the central expressionist claim that art is an expression of emotion, in the sense that each artwork starts with an initial, not fully expressed emotion, which is subsequently fully expressed by the artist in her finished artwork, as a result of her expressive activities. And the reconstruction needs to be general enough to cover both non-ampliative cases, as well as more creative ampliative cases--whether of a conversion or non-conversion kind--that show an ontological development or expansion from the initial to the finished form.
The key to doing so is to postulate two distinct interpretations--though of the same general kind--that can serve as the initial and final stages in the expressive process. In an ampliative case, one of the interpretations would be a more fully developed, ampliative 21 version of the other. (As previously, only ontologically ampliative cases are being discussed, in the absence of an explicit epistemic qualifier). Thus in an ampliative case, an artist first has an initial interpretation X1, of kind X, of subject matter S, which prompts her to attempt to ampliatively expand that interpretation into a more fully developed form X2, which can indifferently be regarded either as an ampliative interpretation of subject matter S, which is more ampliative with respect to S than was X1
itself, or as an ampliative interpretation of the initial interpretation X1.
Clearly the latter view provides a more historically faithful reconstruction of the view of expression theories that it is the initial emotion itself--interpretation X1 of subject matter S--which is what the artist expresses, which is why the initial introduction of the concept of ampliative interpretation in Section V was described in those terms. But once the concept of a specific kind, or 'line', of interpretation of a subject matter S is introduced, that has enough coherence so that there could be a sequence of related interpretations of S--at least two in number, as in a conversion case--of the same kind, from sparse or initial to comprehensive or fully complete interpretations of that kind X of S, then it is theoretically unimportant whether one regards them as interpretations of earlier members in the series, or as interpretations of their common subject matter S.
Thus, to sum up this portion of the discussion, on the current view all genuine artistic creation can be regarded as an expression of emotion, that involves an artistic movement between two limiting stages of interpretation of a subject matter--an initial or sparse stage of interpretation, in which the artist first grasps the possibility of a kind of interpretive 22 approach X to subject matter S in the form of a specific sparse or sketchy interpretation X1 of S, through zero or more intervening stages of interpretation (which intervening stages are cases of Intermediate expression), culminating in a comprehensive interpretation X2 of S which is 'maximally ampliative' of the chosen line of interpretation of S--for example, because it is as specific as possible in its interpretation, or uses the medium as comprehensively as possible, given the artist's chosen medium in which she interprets S.
Thus overall the current interpretive theory of expression potentially provides a theory of ampliative expression of emotion, appropriate to artistic creativity contexts in which there is a substantive difference in content in the final comprehensive interpretation, as opposed to the initial sparse interpretation--and it provides a genuine explanation of that concept of ampliative expression, in that the concept of expression itself plays no part in the interpretive analysis given. While at the same time the theory is also capable of explaining any non-ampliative cases of expression, such as some conversion cases, but without making the mistake of regarding them as necessarily being explanatorily primary in a discussion of creative expression.
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VII. EXPRESSION AND INTERPRETATION
Given the above, reconstructed interpretive expression theory--or just 'interpretive theory'
for short--here is a brief further criticism of Collingwood's own theory in interpretive terms.
First, Collingwood is wrong to identify art with any and all kinds of expression of emotion. 21 For art proper can be concerned only with ampliative interpretations of emotion--other than in those rare cases where an initial emotion, i.e., an initial interpretation of a subject matter, can itself count as being artistically creative.
Nevertheless, non-ampliative interpretations are still interpretations, which may well be Applying these points to the 'Collingwood's dilemma' situation of Section II, the problem is that, since expression is fundamentally an equivalence relation, strictly speaking an 'expression of emotion X' can only produce some content X' that is equivalent to that of X--and hence not ontologically different from it, as in the first horn of the dilemma.
While on the other hand, any expressed content X' that is distinct from content X could not count as an expression of X--which is the other horn of the dilemma.
The way to resolve the dilemma, of course, is to recognize that extra interpretive concepts are required to deal with these complex situations. A relatively abstract and theoretical
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concept of conversion interpretive expression--CI-expression--or simply of conversion interpretation, is needed in such conversion cases, which in non-ampliative cases is still pragmatically an equivalence relation, hence maintaining an abstract link with the ordinary concept of expression. But the concept of ampliative interpretation breaks that link: it is no longer, strictly speaking, an expression concept at all, but rather a replacement for Collingwood's supposed concept of 'creative artistic expression' that has turned out to be illusory--though, once these issues are understood, it is harmless enough to re-use that phrase 'creative artistic expression' as convenient label for the replacement concept of ampliative interpretation itself.
VIII. CONCLUSION
To begin, since a subsidiary goal of this paper has been to exhibit the various concepts or kinds of expression of emotion involved in a discussion of Collingwood's theory, here is a summary list of them, in the order of their introduction. Several of these have been argued to be interpretive rather than expressive concepts, or to have interpretive aspects, but those distinctions are ignored here, unless they are already implicit in the terms used.
Collingwood's official concepts, as outlined in Section I, include Same-level expression, Conversion expression (from lower to higher levels), and related concepts of Initial and
Final expression--which he seems to think apply only in conversion cases, but which I later broaden to non-conversion cases. Before concluding, two related objections to my attempted rehabilitation of an expression theory should be considered. 24 The first objection is that the concept of interpretation has no essential connection with the concept of emotion, and so it is inherently ill suited to explain, or to capture the spirit of, artistic theories of expression of emotion, which do view emotion as being inseparable from expression.
The second objection is that (what some consider to be) the radical implausibility of expression of emotion theories of art, which suppose that even bored portrait painters were somehow 'expressing their emotions' about their rich patrons, is likely to infect an interpretive theory too, even if it can overcome the first objection.
In reply to the first objection, it is clear historically that the relevant concept of emotion for Collingwood was very wide and highly theoretical, 25 which both explains its integral connections with his concept of expression, and which also guarantees (against the second objection) that mere everyday, anecdotal uses or non-uses of the term 'emotion' do not conclusively count against it.
But parallel points can be made in favor of the current interpretive reconstructed concept, as presented in Section VI, which adopts an equally broad basic concept of emotion, as any kind of attitude or interpretive stance toward a subject matter, in the particular context of the passionate involvement of artists in their chosen artistic subjects and interpretive stances. Thus in this broad sense specifically artistic interpretations must always involve emotion.
As for the second objection, the current view has a resource unavailable to Collingwood, in that its analysis of the concept of emotional expression into multiple interpretive 30 concepts assumes that no one paradigm case, such as that of an artist expressing her own spontaneous feelings, can adequately capture the full range of cases of artistic expression.
For example, the portrait painter who feels nothing but indifference for her subject could still undertake a virtual expression of emotion (see Section IV) with respect to him--and thus express the emotions of a hypothetical painter who was enthusiastic about the subject. Nor, pace Collingwood, need this involve any insincerity, since an intention to fake or conceal one's own emotions is quite different from an intention to sincerely delineate the emotions of a hypothetical admirer of a portrait sitter.
Also, this account is still compatible with the basic 'passionate involvement with an interpretation' view of expression of emotion of Section VI, in that there is nothing to prevent the relevant interpretation from being a virtual rather than a real one, as in the present case. The account is also intuitively plausible, in that, in the absence of any passionate involvement by the artist in her picture, the resulting painting would likely be formulaic and inexpressive-a point which accords well with Collingwood's general views about expressive failures.
In conclusion, though my account has been quite critical of Collingwood in various ways, 26 it is nevertheless an initial attempt to rehabilitate or reintroduce a viable expression theory of art into contemporary discussion--surely a goal of which he would have approved. Of course there are several other significant problems facing expression theories, 27 none of which have been discussed here for reasons of space--but at least some initial groundwork has been laid for the attempt. More broadly, the paper has attempted 31 to show that the concept of interpretation is just as central to understanding artistic creativity as it is in the analysis of critical appreciation of artworks. 4 Also my analysis in this paper largely ignores the details of his broadly Humean psychology, as being irrelevant to the main issues discussed here.
5 For example, in that he argues that many conceptions of fine art are not of art proper, but instead only of various technical, amusement or 'magical' activities: see the early chapters of PA.
